NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 27 | Number 4

Article 12

6-1-1949

Labor Law -- Unfair Labor Practice -Discriminatory Denial of Use of Company Hall for
Union Organization
Elizabeth Osborne Rollins

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth O. Rollins, Labor Law -- Unfair Labor Practice -- Discriminatory Denial of Use of Company Hall for Union Organization, 27 N.C.
L. Rev. 562 (1949).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol27/iss4/12

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

if the corporation is not controlled by antagonistic interests, the corporation may be realigned to sustain or defeat diversity jurisdiction, 27 but
even if jurisdiction is sustained by the realignment, the stockholder has
no standing to maintain the suit.
The courts have sought to bring the rule applied in derivative suits
within the doctrine of realignment by stating it in terms of the antagonistic control of the corporation; however, the ultimate result amounts
to a variation in the realignment doctrine which not only violates the
basic theory of derivative suits28 but cannot be reconciled with the practice of treating the corporation as a plaintiff for other jurisdictional
purposes 2 and for the purpose of determining the district in which the
suit may be brought.30
LIVINGSTON VERNON.

Labor Law-Unfair Labor Practice-Discriminatory Denial of
Use of Company Hall for Union Organization
An employer, motivated by anti-union bias, refused to allow union
organizers to hold a meeting of employees in an employer-owned hall,
not connected with the plant, in a North Carolina mill village. The hall
had been used for other community activities in the past without objection. The only other public buildings in the mill village were also owned
or controlled by the employer and unavailable to the organizers. Because of these circumstances the National Labor Relations Board found
that the employer had discriminated against the union in violation of
Section 8(1) of the National Labor Relations Act,1 and ordered that
jected in Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579 (1905), when Justice McKenna
explained that the fiction was created to give federal courts diversity jurisdiction
over corporations and could not be extended. See generally McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, Corporationsin the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 56 HARv. L. REV. 853 (1943).
27 Laughner v. Schell, 260 Fed. 396 (C. C. A. 3d 1919)
(Requirements of rule
23(b) were not complied with.

The court realigned to defeat jurisdiction and

dismissed the bill for failure to comply with th6 rule.).
2" See note 3 supra.
"See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S.
518, 523 (1947) ; Hutchinson Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 Fed. 424,
428 (C. C. A. 8th 1924) ("The amount in controversy is the value of the corporate right sought to be enforced and not the value of . . . [stockholder's]
interest.").
3028 U. S. C. §1401 (Supp. 1948) ("Any civil action by a stockholder on
behalf of his corporation may be prosecuted in any judicial district where the
corporation might have sued the same defendents.").
149 STAT. 452 (1935),
29 U. S. C. §158(1) (1946), subsequently amended by
National Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. -,
29 U. S. C. §158(a) (1)
(Supp. 1947) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7." Section 7 provides, "Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
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it cease and desist from withholding permission to use the hall for
organizational meetings. 2 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals refused
to enforce the order on the ground that the Board had -exceeded its
statutory power as limited by the constitutional provision prohibiting
deprivation of property without due process. 3 In National Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co. the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the order as modified and restricted should be enforced because it
was based on a finding of discrimination not unjustified by the facts and
background.4 Two dissenting justices agreed with the lower court that
the Board's extension of the concept of unfair labor practice infringed
upon the employer's constitutional property rights. Justice Jackson concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority as to what conduct
constituted the unfair practice.
In the previous development of the law relating to the respective
rights of employers and employees 5 in the use of the employer's property, the cases have for the most part been concentrated in thre general
classifications: (1) those dealing with municipal ordinances which indirectly restricted freedom of speech or of the press by providing governmental machinery for the enforcement of conflicting property rights of
employers;6 (2) those dealing with employees' right to .solicit union
members or to distribute union literature during their leisure time on
company property ;7 (3) those dealing with the right of union representshall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such -activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section
8(a) (3)."
'Stowe Spinning Mills, 70 N.L.R.B. 614 (1946).
'National Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., 165 F. 2d 609
(C. C. A. 4th 1947).
U. S. -, 69 S. Ct. 541 (1948).
'See generally: Union Activity on the Employer's Property, 5 LAW. GUILD
REv. 253 (1945).
Such ordinances have been held unconstitutional as inconsistent with the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. These amendments inhibit the power of governments to make laws abridging freedom of speech and of the press; they do not
apply to private individuals. It is not yet clear how far the courts will go in
indirectly depriving owners of property rights by depriving them of remedies by
which such rights may be enforced. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946)
(Jehovah's Witness distributing religious literature on streets of privately owned
town, remained after having been warned by the owner to leave, thereby violating
a municipal ordinance. Ordinance held unconstitutional; the court said it constituted governmental interference with freedom of speech and of the press under
these circumstances [company town]); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S. 517 (1946)
(similar except that town was owned by federal government in its proprietary
function). Compare Shelley v. Kraemer, 332 U. S. 1 (1948), 27 N. C. L. Rv.
224 (1949), with the above two cases.
' This right was well established by the companion cases, Republic Aviation
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U. S.793 (1945), afflrming 142 F.
2d 193 (C. C. A. 2nd 1944), and National Labor Relations Board v. Le Tourneau
Co. of Georgia, 324 U. S. 793 (1945), reversing 143 F. 2d 67 (C. C. A. 5th 1945).
See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. American Pearl Button Co., 149 F.
2d 258 (C. C. A. 8th 1945) (discusses the extension of the law from earlier cases
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atives to have access to employees who spend their full time on the
employer's premises (e.g., a ship or lumber camp). s
The Stowe case differs from most of the previous decisions in that
it deals with the right of outside union representatives to come on an
employer's production premises against his wishes and engage in organizational activities, rather than with the right of employees themselves
to engage in union activities during their spare time on company production premises. 9 The Supreme Court upheld their right to do so, as
limited to the particular circumstances present here.
One of the controlling factors in the instant case seems to be the
absence of any other meeting place. It is difficult to formulate general
rules specifying what weight will be given to any relative degree of
isolation of company property and employees who work on it, but
there are definite indications in the cases which may be pointed out.' 0
In the more extreme cases where employees live and work on the employer's premises, it seems clear that union representatives would have
a right to use the employer's property for organizational purposes subject only to such restrictions as are necessary for maintenance of effiwhich considered a rule prohibiting distribution of literature or solicitation in the
plant valid unless arbitrarily enforced); National Labor .Relations Board v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F. 2d 811 (C. C. A. 7th 1946) (such a rule would be valid
even under the Republic case if the employer showed special circumstances which
made it necessary in order to maintain discipline in the plant or to assure efficient
production) ; May Department Stores v. National Labor Relations Board, 326
U. S. 376 (1945), affirming 146 F. 2d 66 (C. C. A. 8th 1944) (special circumstances justified such a rule as applied to selling floor of a department store, because customers might be affected even though the employees were using their
spare time).
' It is clear that certified representatives may have access to employees to
carry on necessary functions, but whether or not this access may be used for
solicitation of members is a matter on-which the circuit courts do not agree and
the Supreme Court has not spoken directly. It has long been the law that an
employer may not prevent organizers from visiting employees in their companyowned homes. National Labor Relations Board v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 116
F. 2d 816 (C. C. A. 6th 1940). But where the employees live and work on the
same premises, some circuit courts have held that although certified representatives
may come on the property to collect dues, distribute the union newspaper, etc., to
members, they may not use that access to solicit members. Richfield Oil Corp v.
National Labor Relations Board (C. C. A. 9th 1944); National Labor Relations
Board v. Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F. 2d 149 (C. C. A. 2nd 1941). The most
recent decision, however, requires that union representatives be given access to
employees who live and work on the same premises for solicitation purposes as
well as for other union functions. National Labor Relations Board v. Lake
Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F. 2d 147 (C. C. A. 6th 1948).
"ee 9 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 37 (1944), and 12 N.L.R.B. ANN. Rr. 25 (1948),
for a brief r~sum of the previous decisions by the National Labor Relations
Board on this subject.
10 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 788 (1940).
" See note 8, supra. But in Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U. S. 793 (1945), the court seemed to approve of the holding in
the Lake Superior case: "Neither of these is like a mining or lumber camp where
the employees pass their rest as well as their work time on the employer's premises, so that union organization must proceed upon the employer's premises or be
seriously handicapped."
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cient production." In the intermediate situation, where it is practicable
to contact the employees in other ways 12 but not to hold a meeting unless
it can be held on company property, the instant case seems to say that
outsiders have no absolute right to use company property for organizational meetings, but may not be discriminated against as was done in the
Stowe case.' 3 In cases at the other extreme, where there are no circumstances making it impracticable to carry on organizational activities
elsewhere than on company premises, it would seem that the right of
outsiders to use the employer's property for such purposes is very
14
doubtful.
Apparently the strongest factor in the Stowe decision is the existence of anti-union bias. That the employer was motivated by opposition
to the unionization of his employees is not contested.' 5 The National
Labor Relations Board is entitled to consider the manner in which a
company's labor policy is promulgated, and the purpose for which it is
invoked, in determining whether or not an unfair labor practice has been
committed.' 6 Thus the simple fact of refusal to let union organizers
use the hall, motivated by a hope of discouraging or preventing organization of his employees, might be considered in itself a violation of the
Act where the circumstances make such a denial a reasonably effective
means of accomplishing that prohibited objective1 7 Coupled with the
2
"See note 20 infra.
" National Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., U. S. - , 69
S. Ct. 541, 544 (1948) (". . . the refusal by these respondents was unreasonable
because the ball had been given freely to others, and because no other halls were
available for organization. . . . We must require explicit language making it

clear that the mere denial of facilities will not subject respondents to punishment

for contempt.").
"Id. at 543 ("We cannot equate a company-dominated North Carolina mill

town with the vast metropolitan centers where a number of halls are available
within easy reach of prospective union members."); 2 TELLER, LABOR DIsuT-as
AND COLLECIVE BARGAINING 821 (1940)
(discusses cases which hold that use of

company facilities by a union is evidence of domination by the employer in violation of §8(2) of the Act. That section declares that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it. . . ." 49

452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. 158(2) (1946), as amended by National Labor
Management
Relations
29 U. S. C. 158(a) (2) (Supp. 1947).
15Id.
at 543, n. 7. Act, 61 STAT. -,
"Carter Carbureter Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 140 F. 2d 714,
717 (C. C. A. 8th 1944) ("The vice is not necessarily in the rule itself but in the
manner in which and the purpose for which it was promulgated and employed.").
See, e.g., United Aircraft Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 594 (1946) (company refused passes
STAT.

to union organizers, although it granted them to tradespeople and vendors, to
enter a street which had been closed for security reasons during the war; held,
an unfair labor practice); Brown Shipbuilding Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1047 (1946)
(company refused outsiders permission to distribute union literature on companyowned parking lot; held, not an unfair practice in absence of a finding that permission had been asked or refused to distribute it at the gate where other literature was distributed).
"'Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 258, 266 (1941)

("

. .

constitutes

an unfair labor practice inasmuch as it is based on hostility to the right of employees to organize ...").
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fact that on this particular occasion the employer took affirmative action
to prevent use of the hall for organizational purposes, although its custom was to allow a fraternal order, which met in the hall, to handle all
requests to use it, the case is much stronger.1 8 Justice Jackson thought
that had the employer retained direct control over the disposition of the
hall there would have been no unfair practice here, but that having let
the fraternal order dispose of it without interference on previous occasions, the employer could not now depart from its custom without violating Section 8(1).19
As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out, a serious question of constitutional law is involved in the instant case.20 Assuming that
the Congress has power to restrict the property rights of employers
21
when they come into conflict with the rights of employees to organize,
there remains the question whether it has exercised that power to the
extent enforced by the Stowe decision. Although the discretion of the
Board is very broad, it must be exercised within the limits of a statutory
standard. 22 The standard here involved states that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce" 28
his employees in the exercise of their right to organize and bargain collectively. If the Board's orders were unreasonable and arbitrary in view
of that standard, enforcement would deprive the employer of his property without due process of law.24 On the other hand, if in the light
of the particular circumstances of this case it could not properly be said
8 The hall had been built by the company partly as a meeting place for a
fraternal order, Patriotic Order Sons of America, composed of employees and
others. Although the employer had told the Order in letting them use the hall
that it was not to be rented for other purposes, it had been used on numerous
occasions for social and welfare activities, and so far as appears the Order had
passed on all previous requests without interference by the employer). National
Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., U. S. -,
69 S. Ct. 541,
547, n. 1 (1948).
"Old. at 545.
20 National Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., 165 F. 2d 609, 614
(C. C. A. 4th 1947) ("In the pending case there was no evidence of any interference with or restriction upon the men in their communications on labor matters
either with each other or with agents of the union, in the homes of the men or
on the streets of the town, or for that matter in the company's plant itself; and
we think that the Board had no authority to compel the company to surrender their
other property against their will for uses of which they did not approve, since the
Board's power in this direction is limited by a constitutional provision of great
importance under our form of government.").
2 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1
(1937). See generally: Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86
U. OF
PA. L. Ray. 691 (1938).
2 STASON, THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIvE TRIBUNALS 76 (1947).
2349 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158(1) (1946), as amended by National
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. , 29 U. S. C. §158(a) (1) (Supp.
1947), quoted in full supra note 1.
24 Phelps-Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177, 194
(1941) ; Wallace Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U. S.248 (1944).
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as a matter of law that the refusal was not an unfair practice, 25 the
Board is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that its experienced
26
judgment is correct.
Whatever be the merits of the very close question of due process,
the Supreme Court's opinion in the Stowe case is in line with its liberal
policy in construing the National Labor Relations Act. The holding
is restricted to circumstances where two conditions concurrently exist:
(1) physical necessity for holding the meeting, if at all, in the employer's hall; (2) use of the hall, with the employer's assent, by the public
for other purposes. Thus understood, the decision is of limited significance. It remains for the future to disclose where the court will
draw the ultimate line in balancing the conflicting claims of employers
to control property and of union representatives to use it for organizational purposes.
ELIZABETH OSBORNE ROLLINS.

Municipal Corporations-Legislative AuthorityLimitation Thereon
The power of municipalities to legislate on specifically enumerated
subjects is usually supplemented by a general delegation of authority
to pass ordinances for the general welfare of the city. In North Carolina this general enabling act is N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-52 (1943), which

provides that "The board of commissioners shall have power to make
ordinances, rules and regulations for the better government of the town,
not inconsistent with this chapter and the law of the land, as they may
deem necessary."
"[Police ordinances and regulations] must not be inconsistent with
the general laws of the state, including the common law, equity and
public policy."' This principle is frequently relied upon in litigation
involving the validity of a local regulation, and many ordinances are
attacked and overthrown as in conflict with the general law. Therefore,
it is important to attorneys and to local legislative bodies to know what
constitutes such an inconsistency as is contemplated by the statute. How
("Ownership does not always
"' Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 509 (1946)
mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.") ; National
Labor Relations Board v. Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F. 2d 149 (C. C. A. 2nd
1941) ("It is not every interference with properVy rights that is within the Fifth
Inconvenience, and even some dislocation of property rights,
Amendment ....
may be necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining."). This
statement was cited and quoted in the Republic case, 324 U. S. 793,. 803 (1945).
"E.g., Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforcement granted.
142 F. 2d 1009 (C. C. A. 5th 1944).
'3 McQun.LiN, MU NICiPAL CoRPORtATIoNs §953 (2nd ed. 1939).

